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Abstract
This paper focuses on the interplay between Conservative thought as evinced by the current Conservative
Party leadership and the idea of responsibility, which is a central concern in the Big Society programme. I
show that responsibility holds different meanings based on attitudes to work and the welfare state and that
the differentiation in meaning map onto a working class/middle class distinction. I then argue that the 'good
society' as it emerges from the Big Society idea would be a more stratiﬁed one that accepts large degrees
of inequality. Leaving the conceptual plane, I then provide support for my argument with ﬁndings from
qualitative research into the lifeworld of young Conservatives.
Keywords: Big Society, Responsibility, Conservative Party, Values, Sociology of
Morality, Young Conservatives
Introduction
1.1 In one of the earliest speeches in which David Cameron formulated the concept of the Big Society he
said that "the recent growth of the state [under New Labour] has promoted not social solidarity, but
selﬁshness and individualism" (Cameron 2009) and that societal renewal under the Conservatives would
start with focusing on "empowering and enabling individuals, families and communities to take control of
their lives so we create avenues through which responsibility and opportunity can develop" (ibid.). Focusing
on the conceptual underpinnings of the Big Society programme, I want to address the question who
exactly, according to the ideas set out by David Cameron, needs to be more responsible? And what does
'being responsible' entail?
1.2 I ﬁrst provide general context to the sociological signiﬁcance of responsibility and the genesis of the
Big Society concept. Analysing the relevant passages in David Cameron's Big Society speech (Cameron
2009), delivered in November 2009 as the Hugo Young Memorial Lecture, I then show that there inheres in
the notion of the Big Society a clear distinction between the kind of responsibility that working-class
communities are supposed to adopt and the responsibilities that the middle class are intended to exert.
This leads me, thirdly, to ask what kind of society, big or small, it actually is that David Cameron and
Conservative activists envision. In the last section, drawing on interview material with young
Conservatives, I address the question of whether Big Society ideas are reﬂected by and matter to ordinary
members of the Conservative Party.
Responsibility and the origins of the Big Society idea
2.1 As a given social order entails a group-based differentiation of responsibilities toward the institutions of
the state and other citizens, sociologists are well advised to "make [the concept of responsibility] fruitful
for the analysis of the society that is at present taking shape" (Strydom 1999: 65). This is what I intend to
do in this rapid response paper.
2.2 Group-based distinctions of responsibilities can arise in formal ways, e.g. per legal norms, and they
can arise as informal distinctions based on class, ethnicity, gender, etc. that underlie moral evaluations in
everyday life (Sayer 2005a). Accordingly, a Conservative society, i.e. a society that is structured according
to the values that currently dominate the Conservative Party, would hold speciﬁc expectations of certain
groups regarding the preservation of social justice or duties of loyalty (cf. Haidt and Graham 2007; Strydom
1999). In traditionalism, or Toryism, for instance, "charity [is] viewed as an obligation of the church, of the
family and village or neighbourhood, but never of government" (Nisbet 1986: 59).
2.3 The leadership of David Cameron ushered in a period of transformation in what the Conservative Party
would from now on expect of the various groups in society. Responsibility became a much-discussed
concept in the transformation process as Cameron stated clearly in the foreword to the 2006 Conservative
statement of values Built to Last (The Conservative Party 2006) that "this country needs a responsibility
revolution". The responsibility revolution, containing calls for a renewal of personal, professional, civic and
corporate responsibility (The Conservative Party 2006), is the predecessor of the current Big Society
programme. Like Built to Last, the Big Society idea is also seen as testimony of Cameron's belief in
compassionate Conservatism (O'Hara 2007: 48). Its ideological roots lie in traditionalism.
Who is addressed by the call for more responsibility?
3.1 The main section in the Big Society speech in which the theme of responsibility is developed and
discussed is entitled 'Selﬁshness and Irresponsibility'. It starts like this: "This emphasis [evinced in the
previous paragraph, A.B.] on responsibility is absolutely vital. When the welfare state was created, there
was an ethos, a culture to our country – of self-improvement, of mutuality, of responsibility." (Cameron2009) A brief narrative of loss of said ethos follows. Conceptually, the loss of responsibility is here
connected to the existence of the welfare state. The connection is a destructive one, for, so the narrative
of loss and destruction continues, "as the state continued to expand, it took away from people more and
more things they should and could be doing for themselves, their families and their neighbours." (ibid.)
Although the identiﬁer 'welfare' is dropped here, Cameron, since he is engaged in the same narrative, must
be assumed to be talking about the welfare state. What the core of the Big Society speech is saying, then,
is that the welfare state deprived people of the opportunity to 'do things themselves'. People have been led
on to be irresponsible by an ever-expanding state.
3.2 This makes welfare recipients the main targets of the call to behave more responsibly. As the speech
goes on, it becomes clear that responsibility is needed especially in terms of welfare recipients' economic
and moral behaviour. These two aspects are intimately bound together, evinced in statements like this:
"There is less expectation to take responsibility, to work, to stand by the mother of your child, to achieve,
to engage your local community […]." (Cameron 2009) Further criticism of the 'beneﬁt system', of the fact
that people "are paid more not to work than to work" and that they are "ﬁnancially better off if they do the
wrong thing than if they do the right thing" (ibid.) manifests the impression that the Big Society call for
responsibility focuses on a moral renewal and targets predominantly welfare recipients.
3.3 The belief that prolonged assistance by the state to those in need ossiﬁes people's natural
resourcefulness and capability to look after themselves is "written into [the Conservatives'] DNA by
Edmund Burke" (Guardian Editorial, 11 November 2009). A Conservative dose of 'tough love' – and this
may include severe cuts to the public sector, or a 'retrenchment of the state' (Cameron 2009) - can see this
right (cf. Lakoff 2002) which is why the Big Society, for Conservative right-wingers, is also the better
society (Maude 2010).[1]
3.4 Alongside the broken-Britain narrative that leads to the conclusion that swathes of poor Britons need to
start behaving more responsibly, a second narrative strand is developed telling the story of those who
already try to behave responsibly but whose "attempts at playing a role in society are met with inspection,
investigation, and interrogation" (Cameron 2009). For these potential stakeholders, a retrenchment of the
state would mean, for example, "more power directly in the hands of the parents" (Cameron 2009) when it
comes to how their children's school should be run and more power to communities to "agree on the
number and type of homes they want, and to provide themselves with permission to expand and lead that
development" (ibid.).
3.5 The will to wield that kind of power and the knowledge of how to set about imposing one's will on a
community predominantly lies with the middle and upper class (e.g. Bourdieu 1984; Reay 2000). A
retrenchment of the state would restore power to these potential stakeholders whilst assistance to the
needy would be limited.
What is the 'good society' from the Conservative point of view?
4.1 From the Conservative point of view, the 'good society' is an ordered society in which the middle and
upper middle class are active stakeholders. The working class are left to their own devices – not out of
spite, however, but because it is the Conservative belief that a lack of assistance will rekindle the ﬂame of
self-reliance.
4.2 The Big Society, if devised along these lines, would not be as innovative a project as David Cameron
sometimes makes it out. Margaret Thatcher's 1987 statement that "there is no such thing as society", for
one, was followed by words very similar to the ones that Cameron used in his Big Society speech:
There are individual men and women, there are families. And no government can do anything
except through people, and people must look after themselves ﬁrst. It's our duty to look after
ourselves and then, also, to look after our neighbours. (Thatcher 1987 quoted in O'Hara 2007:
211)
4.3 Different to Margaret Thatcher's ultimately highly individualistic take on the value of responsibility,
however, David Cameron understands that "there are connections between circumstances and behaviour"
(Cameron 2006). The Big Society programme that is being implemented by and by therefore aims to affect
a moral change towards a culture of responsibility. Margaret Thatcher's "ﬁnancialisation of everything"
(Harvey 2005: 33) and individualism, then, probably best be considered distant cousins of the Big
Society.[2]
4.4 However, as David Cameron tends to "focus on process rather than on outcomes" (Montgomery 2006),
it is still possible that the outcomes of the Big Society programme as desired by the Conservative coalition
partner would be very similar to the changes affected by Conservative policies in the 1980s and 1990s. For
one, activists are very fond of Margaret Thatcher and Thatcherism.[3] Secondly, it seems likely that for
poor Britons, for the unemployed and for beneﬁt recipients, the alleged repression by the state in the past
would in a Big Society be exchanged for a very deﬁnite repression by local power-holders. The attribute
'neo-medieval' perhaps sums up the social relationships that the Big Society conceptually entails. It has
been used to describe Phillip Blond's (e.g. Blond 2009) sketch of an ideal Conservative society (Gray
2010). Indeed, the Big Society shares its focus on community living with Blond's Red Toryism.[4]
Is this reﬂected in Conservatives' conceptions of a better society?
5.1 In 2008 and 2009, I conducted ﬁeldwork with a Conservative Association at a Scottish university in
order to ﬁnd out, amongst other things, whether young Conservatives' thinking reﬂects the tenets of David
Cameron's Conservatism.[5] The main aim of my research was to capture and analyse the values that
young Conservatives hold and that inhere in the practices that characterise Conservative activism. As the
Conservative membership is from diverse economic, social and cultural backgrounds, the biographical
stories they tell about Conservatism differ widely. Although ideologically heterogeneous, patterns that relate
the young members to Conservatism proper existed. Their standpoints on the responsibilities of poor and
unemployed people comprised one such area of commonality.
5.2 One of my hypotheses was that young Conservatives believe that the Conservative Party does not
only advance the material interests of its core voters, i.e. of the middle and upper class, "but that it […] [is
also] a party that care[s] for society's most vulnerable people and for quality of life issues like the
environment" (Montgomery 2006). Young Conservatives, by this assumption, would consciously aim to
ameliorate the 'unfairness of class' (Sayer 2005a) and to eradicate social inequality.
5.3 This assumption has been partially proven correct. During the time of my ﬁeldwork, the Conservative
Association made a point of often wearing hooded sweatshirts, or 'hoodies'. Hoodies are not the standard
apparel of Conservatives. To the contrary, in 2006, when a shopping centre in Kent attempted to ban the
wearing of hoodies on its premises, they were (somewhat exaggeratedly) identiﬁed and discussed as a
piece of clothing predominantly worn by poor, inner-city adolescents (BBC News online, 10 July 2006). Themajority of Conservatives, in contrast, belong to the middle class (Whiteley 2009). Yet hoodies were the
centre piece of a recruitment campaign that the young Conservatives carried out in 2009. Cheekily
referencing David Cameron's so-called 'hug a hoodie' speech (Cameron 2006), the campaign consisted of
manning an information stall with hoodie-wearing young Conservatives who hugged the passers-by who
seemed interested in Conservative campaign material. I have described this elsewhere as a dressing-down
strategy that was intended to help decontaminate the Tory brand (Bednarek 2011). By showing young Party
members to be warm-hearted and unassuming people the message would be conveyed that the
Conservative Party is a truly inclusive party, that 'we are all in this together'.
5.4 A different and much more complex picture emerges when analysing young Conservatives' reﬂections
on a range of social groups and issues. Generally speaking, One-Nation Tories evince the same kind of
inclusive speaking patterns as does David Cameron. But One-Nation Tories are rare; there were only three
of those among my research participants, and only one of them took an inclusive stance towards welfare
recipients. This young Conservative had lived through poverty:
As a kid, my mum was a single mother, on beneﬁts, ﬁrst living in sheltered accommodation
for homeless […] we were getting our clothes from charity shops and when she went to
collect her money from the post ofﬁce she'd get little cans of food on her beneﬁt cheque.
5.5 The sociological assumption would be that the childhood experience of deprivation predisposes this
young man to have compassion with the poor. However, another research participant of a similar socio-
economic and experiential background was a staunch Thatcherite and of the opinion that welfare recipients
are people who "don't try hard enough" because they are "lazy". This suggests that the economic, social
and cultural determinants of one's childhood do not 'produce' certain values in a monocausal way, as for
instance Inglehart (e.g. Abramson and Inglehart 1995; Inglehart and Norris 2003) would argue, which
complicates the sociological study of political values.
5.6 Rather than considering structural explanations of welfare recipients' behaviour, as for example the
concept of the Big Society does, it is generally agreed among young Conservatives that welfare recipients
are people who fail to take responsibility for themselves. Indignation is a common reaction to this, as is
disdain. Both emotional reactions characterise the passages discussing inhabitants of council estates. The
emotional canopy associated with speaking of unemployed or poor people inevitably involves the drawing
of moral boundaries between the speaker and 'them' (cf. Kirk 2006; Sayer 2002). The following quote is
exemplary for this:
The people [on the council estate] - they lacked ambition! I know it's such a horrible thing to
say about people living around you! It is such a horrible thing to say but I have nothing in
common with them at all.
5.7 The 'I have nothing in common with them at all'-theme is the more signiﬁcant since the speaker lived
on a council estate herself. Markers of poverty are devalued in the way she speaks about the estate,
whilst her own willingness to "work hard" at school emerges as the responsible way of behaving.
[We] moved onto an estate which was one of the worst estates in the area, yah. We had
absolutely nothing. I went to a bad school, an absolutely awful school, and I had pretty bad
behaviour problems because of the changes and I thought 'I'm not going to buy into this. I'll
work hard.' For all intents and purposes I should not be at university because of where I
came from school-wise for my A-Levels. And yet – I did it! When people don't try hard
enough, I don't have time for that, at all. Because I don't buy laziness, I don't buy into the
welfare state the way it's currently used.
5.8 'Working hard' is the primary means of distinction between the narrator and her peers who are labelled
as "lazy" and "buys into the welfare system", and it is working hard which constitutes her not having
anything in common with them. The maxim "we are hard-working, they are lazy" (Sayer 2005b: 953) is one
of the means by which moral boundaries are erected in the above passage.
5.9 Similar incidents of moral boundary drawing occurred in other research interviews. One narrator,
describing the working-class small town that she grew up in, ends on this note:
I just wanted out, I hated it, I hated the small town syndrome, I hated the neds, I hated the
chavs, I hated the fact that there was never anything to do, there was never anywhere to go,
I hated the fact that all my friends just sat around on park benches and got drunk because
there was nothing for them.
Whenever the narrator of this passage visits her hometown, she says, "I don't feel like I've got anything in
common with that place at all".
5.10 The moral boundaries that are established in the quoted passages evolve around the notion of being
worthy through aspiring to transcend the structural limitations of the place of residence or birth. As a worthy
individual, one must try to rise above the council estate or the working-class small town. Failure to do this
cannot be blamed on circumstances. Responsibility and personal moral worth thus overlap in this version
of Conservative thought, both also being connected with a strong depreciation of working-class culture.
5.11 Middle-classness, in contrast, is generally valorised in the way Conservatives talk. Two of the older
Conservatives that participated in my study claimed "freedom of the individual", "the free-market situation"
and 'running my business my way' as central tenets of Conservatism:
I think the core values are in terms of the, you know, the individual is important, erm freedom
in terms of freedom of the individual, you know, the non-interference in terms of the state,
obviously the free-market situation […] Very much focused on the individual, very much
concerned with the freedom of the individual.
I ﬁnd that [young people] are increasingly coming back to our values which are 'I don't want
government to tell me how to run my business', you know, or 'I'm ﬁnding that I'm getting far
too much interference on a day-to-day basis by the state who's trying to tell me what to do,
and I'm now just up against a brick wall in trying to talk to them', or 'there are so many people
interfering and telling me to do it that way and then someone else comes along and tells me
to do it this way.'
5.12 The reference to 'running my business' makes clear that thinking about Conservatism very seldom, for
Conservatives, means thinking about working-class, unemployed or poor people. Indeed, Big Society
ideals pale and lose signiﬁcance compared to the prevalence, impact and sway that neoliberal economics
and their concomitant ideological underpinnings have on the membership. It is therefore much more likely
to hear a young Conservative echo the belief in individualism expressed in the two quotes above than to
hear them speak about welfare recipients with compassion and understanding. The following statement,made by a young Conservative, is thus fairly typical.
I'm quite a big fan of, erm, sort of encouraging individual responsibility and erm that's very
important and also a fan of the fairly traditional democratic sort of values on crime, or maybe
on immigration and especially on Europe and those sorts of things.
5.13 These are not isolated opinions by handful of Conservatives who would be widely deemed non-
representative for contemporary Conservatism. To the contrary, comparing statements made by the Party
leadership on the Big Society idea, by the right-wing media and by the membership, a consensus emerges.
Ultimately, 'caring for society's most vulnerable people' (Montgomery 2006) is not a central concern for a
signiﬁcant proportion of Conservatives.
Summary
6.1 Focusing on the different ways in which responsibility is addressed and discussed among
Conservatives, I argued that for poor, unemployed and working-class people, being empowered and
therefore free from the reach of an overly bureaucratic state may not be advantageous, the reason being
that the Big Society idea entails two different kinds of responsibility.
6.2 The Big Society is one that is socio-economically more stratiﬁed, in which it is local power-holders
identifying and looking out for the people in need and who administer assistance as they see ﬁt. The notion
of empowerment that is at the core of the Big Society idea thus applies positively to those groups in British
society who, over the last decade or so, have felt that their range of action was rather limited due to
interference by the state. These will be business owners, teachers' associations, parents –in short,
Edmund Burke's 'small platoons'. They are already capable of exercising responsibility and need freedom
from interference of the state.
6.3 In contrast, the working class and the poor who have hitherto relied on the state, should attempt to be
self-reliant, to 'make do' without the help of the state. This is what responsibility entails for the working
class. Due to this fundamental difference, the responsibility discourse as it is waged among Conservatives
is best understood as a speciﬁc instance of discussing the failures of the working class with the use of
euphemisms, i.e. by replacing 'working class' with 'those that are irresponsible' (Sayer 2005a; Valentine
1998).
Conclusion
7.1 I showed that young Conservative activists evince attitudes and values that are in support of the moral
differentiation between irresponsible poor people and hampered, well-meaning, and ambitious middle-class
individuals. For them, the good Conservative society is one premised on the acceptance of social
inequality which they believe to be an unchangeable fact of life. Responses regarding the role of the
welfare state differ, paternalist Conservatives being on the whole more favourable of state involvement.
These Conservatives I found to be a small minority, however.
7.2 Structural barriers to self-reliance and the expression of responsibility such as scarcity of resources
are not accounted for by the Big Society programme. Being responsible for oneself, although clearly a
matter that is inﬂuenced by is economic and social circumstances, is individualised and moralised. The
Big Society idea thus shows the character of the 'responsibility revolution' which preceded it and from
which it emerged to be ﬁrst and foremost a moral revolution (cf. Hennessy, Kite et al. 2011) but likely one
that struggles to fully accommodate social facts in its programme of social and cultural transformation.
Furthermore, it is possible that the moral transformation associated with the Big Society would in fact work
to reverse the "shift […] from the traditional emphasis on individual responsibility […] to a new conception
of collective and co-responsibility" (Strydom 1999: 67). The potential of this development in itself indicates
that a renewal of interest in the sociological study of responsibility and an intensiﬁcation of sociological
interest in Conservatism would stand us in good stead for comprehending British society-to-be.
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Notes
1 Right-wingers fail to be convinced, however, so much so that a renewed attempt to explain what the Big
Society means was undertaken earlier this year. The only value propagated by the Big Society that ﬁnds
favour with the Conservative membership is "reforms to welfare that encourage greater independence"
(Montgomery 2011). This probably explains why the impression has emerged that the Big Society is a
euphemism for 'cuts to the welfare system'. Support of welfare reforms rank third on a list of 17 beliefs
deﬁning mainstream Conservatism and is only superseded by "limits on 'nanny state'" and "strong
defence" (ibid.).
2 Maurice Cowling, comparing Margaret Thatcher's politics with other Conservative approaches, suggested
that one should be "careful not to conﬁne 'politics' to creating the conditions in which economic growth is
possible" (Cowling 1978: 2).
3 During my ﬁeldwork, Tim Bale's assessment that Conservatives "admire Thatcher without worshipping
her" (Bale 2010: 379) often struck me as an understatement.
4 David Cameron's espousal of Blond's ideas has only ever been partial, however, as Blond's 'self-
conscious nostalgia' clashes with Cameron's ostentatious push for modernisation (Harris 2009).
5 I spent 12 months with a University Conservative Association (UCA) at a Scottish University during
which I attended the weekly meetings (which lasted approximately two hours each) and accompanied the
young Conservatives to several formal events as well as four regional conferences. I conducted participant
observation and semi-structured interviews with 17 young Conservatives. I also interviewed 3 older
Conservatives. The UCA had approximately 30 active members at the time and was in steady contact with
the local Association's young Conservatives as well as Conservative students at other Scottish
universities. As passionate political activists, UCA members were involved in both student politics as well
as regional and Party politics. They supported by campaigning and canvassing a range of candidates in the
months leading up to the 2010 election and were also involved in a variety of youth events.References
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